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In the Spring of 2014, war between Ukrainian government forces and proxies of 
the Russian government -- assisted by Russian soldiers -- broke out in the eastern 
Ukrainian Oblasts (equivalent of a US state) of Donetsk and Luhansk. The resulting 
war, which continues today, created over 1.3 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), 
including hundreds of thousands who moved into Oblasts which did not directly 
experience conflict. Since then, there have been few studies looking at the Ukrainian 
labor market and none looking at the wars economic impact on it. This paper uses panel 
data from 2010 to 2018 to measure the economic impact of the labor supply shock 
caused by the 2014 War in Donbass in oblast level labor markets that did not directly 
experience conflict. We measure that impact with changes in average wages and 
changes in unemployment in the studied Oblast labor markets. Using econometric 
analysis, we thereby study the ability of Ukrainian labor markets to adjust to shocks in 
their current post-Soviet environment. We find a negative and statistically significant 
impact on wages and a statistically insignificant impact on unemployment. The results of 
this paper can help provide an accurate picture of the current Ukrainian labor market by 
highlighting rigidities in the labor market. 
Introduction 
In the Spring of 2014, Russia invaded Ukraine, seizing Crimea and launching a 
war between Ukrainian government forces and proxies of the Russian government -- 
assisted by Russian soldiers – that broke out in the eastern Ukrainian Oblasts 
(equivalent of a state in the US) of Donetsk and Luhansk. The resulting war, which 
3 
 
continues today, created over 1.3 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), including 
hundreds of thousands fleeing into Oblasts which did not directly experience conflict. 
Since then, there have been few studies looking at the Ukrainian labor market and none 
looking at the war's economic impact on it.  
This paper uses panel data from 2010 to 2018 to begin to study that impact. We 
measure the economic impact of the labor supply shock caused by the 2014 War in 
Donbass on the labor markets in oblasts that did not directly experience conflict. 
Assuming the IDPs join the workforce in their new locations, basic economic theory 
predicts the primary initial economic impact will be an increase in labor supply i.e. a 
rightward shift in the supply curve, decreasing the equilibrium market wage. Empirical 
economic research suggests that the effect on wages is more ambiguous, with certain 
papers suggesting an effect around statistical zero (Boustan, 2010, and Frank, 2009) 
while others do not (e.g. Calderon, 2009). This departure could be explained multiple 
ways. The casual relationship could be more complex than basic economic theory 
suggests meaning other variables could be an important factor. The result could also 
reflect local economic institutions. A deeper discussion of the literature will be later in 
the paper.  
Using econometric analysis, we analyze the reaction of Ukrainian labor markets 
to shocks in their current post-Soviet environment. That environment is now changing 
as the new Ukrainian government is currently attempting to overhaul the Ukrainian labor 
code for the first time since the 1970s (Kokriatski, 2020). There are many unanswered 
questions about the Ukrainian labor market. How did local markets react to the 2014 
war? Did they react in a way that is consistent with known market analysis? How might 
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labor market outcomes be improved? The results of this paper can help improve our 
understanding of the current Ukrainian labor market by highlighting possible rigidities in 
the labor market.  
Background 
On April 7, 2014—following months of protest and Russia’s seizure of the 
Crimean Peninsula -- government buildings were stormed and taken over in regions 
with large populations of ethnic Russians. While peace was restored in most oblasts, 
Luhansk and Donetsk persisted leading to the national government declaring Anti-
Terrorist Operations (ATO) on April 15 (Bartkowski, 2015). Through the following weeks 
the crisis devolved into a full-scale war -- which continues today -- between Ukrainian 
forces and Russian proxies and Russian forces leading to the death of over 3,000 
civilians and internal displacement of 1,373,675 as of March 2019 (National Monitoring, 
2019). Of those almost 1.4 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDP), 417,292 moved 
out of the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts. The most impacted Oblast was Kyiv with an 
incoming IDP population being equal to 32% of the 2015 population. Luhansk and 
Donetsk had an IDP population equal to 11% of their 2015 population. The City of Kiev, 
Kharkiv, Zaporizhia, Dnipro, Riyne, Poltava, Odessa, and Kherson all had IDP 
populations between 1% and 5.1% of their 2015 population. All other oblasts had IDP 
populations less than 1% of their 2015 population. Luhansk and Donetsk were not 







Figure 1: Cumulative IDPs as a percentage of each oblast’s population  
 
This paper looks at the economic impact of those 417,292 IDPs on the labor 
markets of the 22 non-war-thorn Ukrainian Oblasts. We use quarterly net migration data 
from 2010 to 2018 collected by the State Statistics Service to estimate the economic 
impact on wages and unemployment.  
Ukrainian labor laws have been governed by the Labor Code of Ukraine which 
was adopted in December 1971 by the Ukrainian SSR (Про Затвердження, 1971). It 
was developed for a command economy in which all markets, including labor markets, 
were suppressed. Ukrainian labor laws have been almost untouched since. There have 
been multiple attempts at reform with the most recent being in early 2020 by the newly 
elected President Volodymry Zelensky — who was not born for almost a decade after 
the labor code was passed -- (Kokriatski, 2020). The code is also long -- 87 pages in 18 
chapters — and regional and local governments have little room to make specific 
reforms or local adjustments. Like other past reform attempts, the latest reform bill was 
scuttled by pressure from labor unions (Government, 2020).  
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Prior to the breakout of the war, the Ukrainian economy was a mixed bag. From the turn 
of the 21st century until late 2008, Ukraine saw positive GDP growth in every quarter. 
Since then, the economy has seen spurts of growth and contraction prior to 2014. 
Starting in 2014, there was an economic contraction caused by the war and political 
instability, with recovery in 2016 to steady growth. 






























For most of the 21st century until 2011, Ukraine saw inflation over five percent 
but was generally able to keep it under ten percent outside the global financial crises. 
Starting in mid-2011 inflation began to decline until reaching a slightly deflationary 
status 2012 and staying there until early-2014.  It naturally peaked in 2015 with the 
economic disruption caused by the war, but then returned to 10-15% to 2018. 











When it comes to unemployment, Ukraine experienced a steadily declining 
unemployment rate of 9.8% in quarter one of 2004 to 6.5% in quarter three in 2008. By 
the first quarter of 2009, unemployment was over 10% and never got below 7% for 
more than a quarter at a time since 2009. Since the 2014 recession, unemployment has 




















 Literature Review 
This paper contributes to two different literatures -- that on the Ukrainian labor 
market and the literature on the impact of internal migration on local labor markets. 
When it comes to the Ukrainian labor market literature, much of the relevant literature 
either is prior to the outbreak of the war or does not address its economic impact. I was 
only able to identify one Ukrainian labor market study which mentioned the war 
(Lukianenko, 2017). The large gap in the literature creates a significant problem. 
Ukraine has one of Europe's largest populations and is its largest country in terms of 
area. It also has struggled to abandon its Soviet past and liberalize its economy. One of 
the area’s most in need of reform is labor markets. As of January 2020, the Zelensky 
government is attempting the first overhaul of the Ukrainian labor code since the 1970s. 
The proposed reform introduces multiple important changes to the law including at will 
employment, minimum union sizes, limiting the number of unions per enterprise, and 
limiting union protections (Kokriatski, 2020). The goals of these reforms are to limit the 
size of the labor black market, promote dynamism, and increase economic growth.  
In this paper we study how IDPs from the Donetsk and Luhansk regions 
impacted the labor markets they moved to after the war broke out. The influx into non-
war-torn oblasts would be relatively small in its magnitude. The results of this paper 
would help fill in critical details which the current literature has not addressed and 
perhaps thereby providing the basis for more potent reforms.  By providing specific 
quantitative measurements on Ukrainian labor market relations, policy makers could 
better target their reforms.  
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This study also builds on the published literature looking at the impact of internal 
migration on local labor markets. While the research looking at the impact of 
immigration is rich, the number of studies looking at impact of internal migration on labor 
markets is relatively sparse. Internal migration and immigrants could potentially have 
different impacts because of language differences, skill differences, culture differences, 
or legal barriers (Jamil, 2012). Most of the internal migration labor impact research 
focuses on causes not impacts. Research has shown labor supply shocks caused by 
internal migration in the United States during the Great Depression were adjusted to in 
the local labor market by reductions in the quantity of employment rather than in lower 
wages (Boustan, 2010). Boustan (2010) found for the inflow of 37,000 males from Dust 
Bowl effected regions has a substantial economic impact on 21,7000 Californian males. 
They found for every 10 arrivals, 1.9 residents left the area, 2.1 residents were forced 
out of the labor market and 1.9 residents went from full-time employment to part-time 
employment. Their reduction in wages was statistically insignificant. The study exploited 
variation between labor markets to control for the macroeconomic contraction. Another 
study looking at internal migration in post-unification Germany, found no significant 
wage effect but a one percent increase in the population of east German migrants 
increased the employment rate by 1.4% the next year (Frank, 2009).  
Other research has partially confirmed and partially disputed these findings. A 
study looking at the impact of conflict induced migration in Colombia found a 1.4% 
reduction in wages for a 10% increase in the share of migrants (Calderon, 2009). These 
results were supported by another study that found a 1% increase in conflict induced 
population in Colombia lowered wages by 1.4% the following year and a 1% conflict 
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induced population increase raised the rate of out-migration of 0.2% (Morales, 2017). 
Similarly, a study looking at Canadian internal migration found an increase in internal 
migration had “a rather small'' negative effect on the growth of wages while also finding 
a strong effect on unemployment (Wrage, 1981). The simplest way to summarize these 
studies is to note their results tend to be either insignificant or small.  
 
Expected Results and Approach  
Overall, I expected this paper to find results in line with economic theory.  
According to standard economic theory, when the supply of labor increases, in a well-
defined market, -- as would result from a positive labor supply shock -- there would be 
an impact on both dependent variables this study looks at, at least in the short run. An 
increase in the labor force would be expected to decrease wages -- demand curves are 
downward sloping after all. Conversely, the addition of different workers would have an 
ambiguous effect on unemployment. It would likely depend on the composition of the 
internally displaced persons — data we don’t have — and where they moved to. 
Essentially, I expect a negative coefficient when looking at wages and have no 
expectation when I’m looking at unemployment. Identifying well-defined labor markets 
was a key challenge in this paper.  
One of the purposes of this study is to examine the strength of Ukrainian labor 
markets in the post-Soviet environment. If the study found it’s expected results -- a 
negative coefficient when looking at wages -- that would suggest Ukrainian labor 
markets are healthy and responded to changes in the economic environment. If the 
coefficient did not match our expected results, that would suggest our model was 
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misspecified. For example, one shortfall we considered too late too address was the 
outflow of Ukrainian men out of the labor markets and into the armed forces. Our model 
does not capture that effect. If both results were different than the expected signs that 
would suggest Ukrainian labor markets are not healthy but would leave other potential 
explanations as well. The Ukrainian State Statistics Service could be failing to be 
capturing accurate economic information in their economic statistics -- either because of 
a flawed data generation process or because of significant economic activity happening 
off the books in black-markets. Another explanation would be a faulty methodology. A 
true and unbiased but significant value could have failed to be discovered because of 
an insufficiently refined methodology.  
This paper looks at the impact IDPs from Donetsk and Luhansk had on labor 
markets in oblasts not directly affected by military conflict. In order to get data with 
higher frequency, net migration to each oblast is used as a proxy for IDP movement, 
because that is the only quarterly available data. Because net migration between 
regions is relatively constant and there is no other significant event to cause large 
movements in the population, any large changes in net migration is likely because of the 
2014 war. The descriptive statistics for net migration are shown below.  
This paper looks at a variety of variables. The independent variable used was 
labor force for each oblast for every time period observed (x, it). The corresponding 
dependent variables (y, it) were nominal wages and unemployment. Nominal wages 
were used because inflation was fairly stable outside of 2014, 2015, and 2016. Each 
variable had an observation collected for each quarter from quarter one 2010 until 
quarter one 2018 -- totaling 825 observations. The data was collected from the State 
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Statistical Service of Ukraine website. To control for confounding factors, control 
variables were used for oblast fixed effects (Φ), time fixed effects (Ꞇ), a proxy for local 
institutions (Ꝑ), and gross regional product of the prior quarter (Ǥ). The descriptive 
statistics for the dependent and independent variables are below.  
Figure 5: Descriptive statistics  
 
The first series of models we ran employed Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). The 
results here tended to cluster around statistical zero. Models estimating the impact of 
net migration on unemployment were systematically weaker than models estimating the 
impact on wages. These results were believed to be a result of inadequate model 
specification. To improve our results, and deal with endogeneity problems, we switched 
to a two stage least squares (2SLS) model using changes in the variables of interest 
(average wages and Oblast unemployment) as the dependent variable and changes in 
the labor force as the independent variable, with net migration — proxying for IDPs -- as 
the instrumental variable.  
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In the first stage net migration was used as an instrumental variable to generate 
predicted values for the change in the labor force to eliminate endogeneity. Those 
predicted replace the original x value and are represented by px. Net migration was 
directly correlated with labor force but, being exogenously forced, was assumed not 
correlated with wages or unemployment. With this experimental design, we will be able 
to see the impact IDPs had on labor markets on non-impacted regions. Net migration to 
each oblast is used as a proxy for the number of IDPs — albeit a far from perfect one. 
 
OLS Equation: Δ Yit = β1 Δxit + (Conflcit: Δxit ) +β2 Φi +β3 Ꝑi -1 +ε 
First Stage Equation: Δ xit = β0 + β1 IVit +β2 Φi +β3 Ꝑi-1 +ε 
Second Stage Equation: Δ Yit = β1 p Δ xit + (Conflcit: Δxit ) +β2 Φi +β3 Ꝑi -1 +ε 
 
 In the regressions, Φ is used control for fixed effects across both oblasts which 
allowed us to identify the labor markets at the oblast level. Ꝑ represents how an oblast 
voted in the 2014 Presidential election as measured by the share of each oblast that 
voted for reformist candidate Petro Poroshenko. The 2014 vote share was used as a 
control because I believe the more an Oblast was to vote for Poroshenko the stronger 
the reformist elements would be in the city and oblast governments, and hence the 
more liberal or reformist their interpretation of the Soviet Labor Code.  Why do we care 
about which oblasts have stronger liberal or reformist elements? That ties back to the 
1971 law. It was meant to stifle markets and enforce labor discipline. Reformist regions 
would be more likely to interpret the law in a way that allows more market function. In 
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these regions, we would expect results closer to standard market outcomes than in 
regions which varied from the 1971 law.  
We also worked with alternative model specifications in our investigation which 
are not presented here. We worked with time fixed effects, but those controlled for too 
much of the variation. We looked at percent changes in our dependent and independent 
variables, but those provided noisier results. We also looked at the impact of different 
interesting control variables like the percent of the informal workforce, Gross Regional 
Product, or different economic makeups. 
 
Panel Results 
 The first result we’ll look at is the simple relationship between the predicted labor 
force — PX -- and wages, without any controls. Only the second stage will be shown but 
all stages can be seen in the appendix.  
Figure 6: Labor force ~ wage 2SLS result  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error. P > t 
Intercept 1539.8062 343.040 0.000 
Predicted labor force 2.8473 0.453 0.000 
For our first set of regressions (Figure 6) — the naïve labor force regressed 
against wages -- the coefficient is a positive 2.8473 meaning for every increase in the 
predicted labor force by 1,000 there is an increase in wages by 2.85 Hryvnia. The p-
value is zero to the third decimal place meaning the result is statistically significant at 
the one percent confidence level. Similarly, the regression only explains 5.3% of the 
variation in the observations.  
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This result presents a significant issue that took up a lot of time solving. As 
noted, the coefficient here is positive which goes against the expected results. The 
obvious hypothesis for the impact of an increase in the labor force would have on 
wages would be a decrease on wages because demand curves slope downward. As 
the quantity of labor increases, we would expect the wage for that market to decrease. 
In this case the results suggest more labor increases the wage. That suggested we 
failed to correctly identify the market demand curve in our first regressions. Later in this 
paper, we will address how we found the market demand curve.  
Figure 7: Labor force ~ unemployment 2SLS result 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error. P > t 
Intercept 32.7955 4.264 0.000 
Predicted labor force 0.0397 0.006 0.000 
Next, we have our second regression (Figure 7) —labor force and 
unemployment. We have the second stage estimation for our predicted labor force 
represented by PX and the number of unemployed. As you can see the coefficient is a 
positive 0.0397 meaning for every increase in the predicted labor force by 1,000 there is 
an increase in the number of unemployed by 40 persons. The p-value is zero to the 
third decimal place meaning the result is statistically significant at the one percent 
significance level. Similarly, the regression only explains 6.5% of the variation in the 
observations.  
Next, we have our third regression (Figure 8) —labor force and wages with 
controls. To properly identity the labor demand curve we made multiple changes to our 
model specification to improve our results.  First, we focused on the relation between 
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changes in labor and changes in wages or unemployment between quarters to more 
directly capture the labor demand curve. We controlled for regional fixed effects and 
local variation in institutional quality through the proxy variable. We also had an 
interaction term between a conflict dummy and the change in labor force force to 
measure the impact of the conflict. We interacted the war period with net migration to 
better show the differences in impact of net migration between the war and the pre-war 
period. Our war period dummy variable went from the pre-war zero to war one at 2014 
quarter 2.  
Figure 8: Labor force ~ wage 2SLS result 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error. P > t 
Predicted labor force -24.1208 9.259 0.009 
Conflict:Predicted LF 0.5847 0.069 0.000 
Institutional Control 446.7552 152.494 0.004 
Regional fixed effects  Yes  
Above we have the second stage estimation for our predicted labor force 
represented by PX and the change in wages. As you can see the coefficient is a 
negative 24.1208, meaning for every increase in the predicted labor force by 1,000 
there is a decrease in the change in wages by 24.12 Hryvnia. This result is in line with 
what we would expect in a functioning market economy. The p-value is 0.009 meaning 
the result is statistically significant at the one percent significance level. The regression 





Figure 9: Labor force ~ unemployment 2SLS result 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error. P > t 
Predicted labor force -0.2246 0.227 0.324 
Conflict : Predicted LF 0.0012 0.002 0.486 
Institutional Control 4.5695 3.746 0.223 
Regional fixed effects  Yes  
Finally, we have our fourth regression (Figure 9) —labor force and 
unemployment with controls. This table presents the second stage estimation for our 
predicted labor force, represented by PX, and change in the number of unemployed. As 
you can see, the coefficient is a negative 0.2246 meaning for every increase in the 
predicted labor force by 1,000 there is decrease in the change of the number of 
unemployed by 225 persons. The p-value is 0.324 meaning the result is statistically 
insignificant at the ten percent significance level. The regression explains 88.4% of the 
variation in the observations. While the sign of our coefficient did change, our 
hypothesis was an ambiguous effect on unemployment.  
These results also supported the usage of a 2SLS model with net migration as 
the instrument. The final stage results showed much lower F-statistics compared to the 
first stage and low standard errors. 
Overall this study was able to answer most of the questions it asked. How did 
wages respond to the war caused shock? The wages from quarter to quarter declined 
with the increase in the predicted change in labor force in a small but statistically 
significant amount. How did unemployment respond? The change in unemployment 
was ambiguous as our result was statistically insignificant. When we hypothesized our 
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expected results earlier, we expected an ambiguous effect because we believed the 
result would depend on the composition of the internally displaced persons and where 
they moved to. If we were correct in that hypothesis, our insignificant result is from an 
insufficiently detailed specification. The biggest shortcoming of this study is failing to 
sufficiently specify a developed labor force unemployment model so the results would 
be statistically significant.  
While this paper is limited, it provides a foundation several clear improvements 
that could be made which would guide how this research is improved if continued. First, 
better data on the characteristics on the IDPs leaving Donetsk and Luhansk and where 
they went. Someone who spent their whole lives working in coal mines would have 
greater trouble reentering the labor market in a region which didn’t have coal mines than 
someone who worked in a more general field.  
Similarly, while we considered the quality of local governments, we did not 
consider welfare support by the national government for IDPs. Depending on the level 
of support, IDPs could be pushed into the labor force quicker or slower than otherwise. 
For example, if a family which was displaced received generous support from the 
government then they would be able to be more selective of employment options 
because they could stay out longer.  
Lastly, one issue we didn’t consider until late in the process was Ukrainian men 
leaving their local labor force to join the military and fight in the east. While the inflow of 
refugees was a positive shock the mobilization was a negative shock. The effect of 
these two shocks would be ambiguous without knowing the magnitude of each. An 
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improvement to the data could be adjusting net migration figures with mobilization 
numbers.   
 
Conclusion 
The War in Donbass has had an immense human cost and impact well beyond 
the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts. This study attempts to estimate some of the 
economic impact IDPs from the conflict zone had on the labor markets of non-war-torn 
Oblasts. We do not have quarterly data on IDPs, and so had to attempt to instrument 
them. The first stage of our two stage least squares attempts to do this with the net 
migration instrument.  
 Our preliminary investigation suggested an increase in the labor force has a 
slight positive to insignificant impact on wages depending on the specification of the 
model. This result contradicted what we would expect from economic theory. We were 
able to fine tune our model to better identify the labor market demand curve. In doing 
so, we found an increase in labor force leads to a significantly significant decrease in 
wages.  We also found a negative, but statistically insignificant, impact on 
unemployment. Both these results fit our hypothesis of a negative impact on wages and 
an ambiguous impact on unemployment.  
This investigation also consistently found that models estimating the impact of 
labor force on unemployment were stronger than the models investigating the impact of 
labor force on wages. This shouldn’t be too surprising since there is more of a direct 
relationship. This investigation found simpler models had stronger and more statistically 
significant results, but with the theoretically wrong sign, than models that attempted to 
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control for confounding variables. This opposite result arose from market identification 
and endogeneity problems.  These were dealt with by controlling for regional markets, 
political environment, and the conflict, and instrumenting the change in labor with net 
migration, influenced during the war period by IDP movements.  
Overall, these results have a major implication for labor reforms in Ukraine. While 
labor reforms are necessary it does appear, Ukraine has somewhat functioning labor 
markets in their post-Soviet economic environment. So, while reform may be necessary, 
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Appendix 4: Labor force ~ unemployment 2SLS full result 
 
 
 
